State-business relations in post-1998 Indonesia:The role of Kadin by Hartono, I.
  
 University of Groningen
State-business relations in post-1998 Indonesia
Hartono, I.
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2011
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Hartono, I. (2011). State-business relations in post-1998 Indonesia: The role of Kadin. Groningen:
University of Groningen, SOM research school.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
Chapter 4 Business Representation in Indonesia:  
The Role of Kadin 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the organization of business representation in Indonesia 
during the past few decades. In particular, it focuses on Kadin as the peak 
organization representing the interests of the Indonesian business sector. In 
Indonesia, each business sector has its own association that represents the 
specific interests of companies within this sector. On top of all these 
associations is Kadin, the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 
Particularly important is the question to what extent Kadin can play a role as the 
peak business organization. As was argued in Chapter 2, its real functioning 
may depend on: (1) its legitimacy, which is linked to the question whether its 
operations are recognized by the state and/or by society as a whole; (2) its 
credibility, i.e. whether it can be seen as an organization that is capable of 
managing and defending business interests in general, as well as adequately 
handling internal conflicts with respect to diverging business interests of 
different groups of the Indonesian business community; and (3) its degree of 
institutionalization of channels and mechanisms to represent interests with the 
state concerning policymaking. 
This chapter deals with these issues and describes to what extent Kadin 
has developed since its foundation (in 1968) in terms of its legitimacy, 
credibility, and institutionalization. Before these issues are discussed, Section 
4.2 provides a brief description of the history of Kadin, followed by a 
discussion of the efforts of the Kadin leaders to get formal recognition of the 
organization (Section 4.3). This was seen as an important step towards its 
legitimacy by both state and society. Section 4.4 provides an overview of the 
organizational structure in order to put the discussion of Kadin’s legitimacy, 
credibility and institutionalization in a clear context. Section 4.5 describes the 
recent efforts of Kadin to institutionalize channels of communication with 
important decision making institutions to support its aim of influencing the 
policymaking process. The credibility of Kadin, especially within the business 
society (i.e. internal credibility), is discussed in Section 4.6. In particular, the 
existence and nature of conflicting interests between the different groups of the 
business community are discussed, emphasizing the challenges Kadin has been 
faced with in its aim to represent its members’ interests. As will be argued (and 
discussed in more detail in the concluding remarks in Section 4.7), the apparent 
fragmentation of the Indonesian business society has made it difficult for Kadin 
to operate as an effective business representative. 
  
 66 
4.2 A Short History of Kadin until 1987187 
The earliest traces of collective business representation in Indonesia go back to 
the formation of a chamber of commerce during the colonial era. During the 
Dutch colonization, collective business was organized by the ‘Kamers van 
Koophandel en Nijverheid’, the chamber of commerce and industry established 
in 1863. It mainly dealt with the interests of the five big Dutch trading 
companies (Borsumij, Jacobson van den Berg, Internatio, Lindeteves, and Geo 
Wehry), which dominated the Indonesian economy in those days, as well as 
with the interests of some private companies owned by Chinese businessmen. 
The business interests of indigenous businesses, which mainly produced 
agricultural products, were barely taken into account most of the times Yet, 
from the early 20th century until 1945, a period during which the people’s 
resistance against the colonial power was growing, collective native business 
representation came into being. This representation usually had a religious 
background and focused on empowering native businessmen to resist the 
colonial economic structure and the Chinese businesses that acted as 
intermediaries between the natives and the modern (colonial) economy. 
After the independence and during the reign of Soekarno (1949-1965), 
business representation was organized through the establishment of the Central 
Economic Council of Indonesia (Dewan Ekonomi Indonesia Pusat/DEIP), 
which represented a large number of industry-specific associations. Organizing 
business representation in this way fitted into Soekarno’s wish to develop a 
centralized system of governance and policymaking. The establishment of the 
Central Economic Council did not lead to appropriate control over business, 
because several associations remained independent, resulting in the 
fragmentation of business representation. Therefore, the government created 
two new organizations in 1956: the national Council of Business and Trade 
(DPP), and the regional Assembly of Business and Trade (MPP). Yet, this did 
not prevent business from establishing new associations, leading to a further 
fragmentation of business representation. The main goal of these associations 
was to oppose the dominance of Chinese businessmen in the economy.  
The Soekarno government made a third attempt at reforming business 
representation and increasing its control over the business sector by establishing 
the national Business Council (BAMUNAS) in 1964. This peak organization 
was established to act as an intermediary between business and the government; 
it was supposed to represent business interests. As argued by MacIntyre, 
BAMUNAS was one of the precursors of the corporatist organizations that were 
to be established later during President Soeharto’s New Order.188 In practice, 
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BAMUNAS did not function as an intermediary between business and 
government. Rather, the organization acted as fundraiser for the government. 
After the overthrow of the Soekarno government and the establishment of 
the New Order, the corporatist relationship between government and business 
was further strengthened. Soeharto aimed at stronger controlling business and 
their representatives. He first abolished BAMUNAS in 1967, and in 1968 a new 
peak business organization was established: Kadin-Indonesia. Kadin-Indonesia 
started off in November 1967 as a local business organization focusing on 
Jakarta (Kadin-Jaya, or Greater Jakarta-Kadin, also known as Kadin-DKI), 
which was supported by city governor Ali Sadikin. This initiative was followed 
by the establishment of other regional chambers, equivalents of Kadin-Jaya. 
These regional entities were financially supported by the government. During a 
national congress in September 1968, where many regional chambers of 
commerce and industry were present, Kadin-Indonesia (in this thesis referred to 
as Kadin) was established. It was decided that this organization should become 
the main intermediary between business and government. This was not to say 
that there were no other forms of business representation, but Kadin was 
supposed to be the most important of these.  
During its first years, Kadin was led by representatives from the military 
who were closely related to the political leaders.189 Under the Soeharto 
leadership it was common practice that military officials were given strategic 
positions in corporatist organizations like Kadin. In this way, the President was 
better able to control the organization and its members. Moreover, it increased 
the bond between the President and the military. The President gave the military 
access to crucial positions in the economy, of which they could profit. In return, 
he asked loyalty from the military, which he needed to stay in power. In theory, 
this construction linked the business sector closely to the President and his 
government, but only if the military leaders of Kadin were willing to listen to 
their demands and were willing to help shape policies that would support 
business interests. In practice, during their leadership Kadin’s role as a business 
representative was weak, since these military leaders did not focus primarily on 
representing business interests. On the contrary, they represented the interests of 
the President and the government. Kadin was firmly linked to the government, 
and there was little room for independent views on business interests. 
In the 1970s, Kadin’s position became more and more formalized. It was 
the organization itself that insisted on the formalization of its position. A major 
breakthrough in this process was the centralization of Kadin’s organizational 
structure in 1972, when the constitutions of the regional chambers of commerce 
and industry were integrated into the constitution of Kadin. The efforts of Kadin 
finally led to the official recognition as the peak business organization by way 
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of Presidential Decree no. 49 in 1973. Further improvements of the internal 
organization and structure of Kadin were made in 1976 and 1982. This was 
followed by an official mentioning of Kadin in the so-called State Policy 
Outline document (GBHN) in 1983, and later by an official mentioning in the 
fourth Five Year Development Plan (Repelita IV) in 1984. Kadin’s role as an 
intermediary between business and government became fully recognized with 
Law No.1 of 1987, – which will be discussed in more detail below. Sukamdani 
Gitosardjono, a private sector entrepreneur who was chairman of the Sahid 
Group – one of the largest business conglomerates of Indonesia – was President 
of Kadin during the 1980s, and his leadership was important in gaining formal 
recognition. 
In spite of its efforts to become formally recognized, during the first two 
decades of its existence Kadin did not gain a strong position as a representative 
of business interests in communicating with the government. This was mainly 
the result of the low appreciation by both the business community and the 
government. 
The business community merely saw Kadin as a government tool and its 
leaders as self-interested, instead of representing more general business 
interests.190 Businessmen became members for opportunistic reasons mainly. 
Membership was almost a necessity, since on the one hand it showed that they 
accepted the dominant role of the government, and on the other hand it allowed 
them to at least participate in project procurements of the government. At the 
same time, the costs of membership were rather modest. 
Yet, many businessmen, especially those connected with large business 
conglomerates, had more direct channels to the government to get things done, 
even if they were members of Kadin.191 The links of the leaders of large 
business conglomerates with the government were especially important in the 
1990s when the network between the President and business leaders became 
tighter. The importance of direct informal relations of large business 
representatives with the government made life difficult for Kadin as the formal 
representative of Indonesian business.192  
With regard to the government’s appreciation of the organization, 
MacIntyre argues that the government and government officials did not take 
Kadin seriously.193 In general, in communications on economic plans and 
policies with ministers, Kadin did not play an important role. Kadin was hardly 
ever consulted before or even after the introduction of new policies. There were 
several reasons for this. First of all, there may have been cultural and 
ideological reasons. Senior government officials generally considered 
businessmen to be inferior. Moreover, within Pancasila – the official 
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Indonesian state ideology, with its emphasis on collectivism and co-operation – 
profit making and the market economy condemned. Pancasila was very 
influential in policymaking.194,195 
Next to these ideological and cultural reasons, Kadin also had little 
credibility among government officials due to the fact that several of its leaders 
were involved in patronage. Moreover, often these business leaders were not 
seen as serious partners in discussions on economic policies. According to 
government officials, leaders of Kadin were not well-prepared and were ill-
informed with respect to economic developments.196 Perhaps most importantly, 
however, the government could see its power reduced the moment it would 
listen to the demands of Kadin. Put differently, in the corporatist model of the 
New Order regime, corporatist organizations such as Kadin were to be heard, 
but not to be listened to. 
4.3 Formal Recognition of Kadin: The Law of 1987 
Almost from the beginning of its establishment, the leaders of Kadin sought for 
official recognition in terms of a law ratified by parliament, to strengthen 
Kadin’s position within business and policy circles, i.e. to establish its 
legitimacy vis-à-vis society. To start with, such a law would make it more 
difficult for the government to ignore Kadin, as it had done during 1945-1965 
with an organization like for example BAMUNAS. Moreover, a formal 
legislative basis would increase Kadin’s role in policymaking, especially if the 
law were to explicitly refer to Kadin’s role as an advisor or consultative partner 
with respect to economic policymaking.  
Apart from legal recognition, Kadin’s leaders also aimed at making 
membership of the organization compulsory for all existing business 
associations. They hoped that this would reduce opposition against Kadin, while 
at the same time it would strengthen Kadin’s position in communications and 
policy discussions with the government. It appears that the government realized 
this latter interest, since in official communications they stated that Kadin was 
already seen as the peak business organization and that therefore there was no 
need for compulsory membership. Apparently, the government saw compulsory 
membership as a threat, since it could make Kadin stronger and more influential 
in political decisions. 
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Another reason for claiming compulsory membership was financial. 
Kadin appeared to be unable to finance its operations from the fees paid by its 
members. For example, in 1985, only 75 per cent of the members paid their fees 
to Kadin. In order to continue during the 1980s, Kadin had to rely on financial 
support from several influential businessmen, of whom Liem Soe Liong – a 
Chinese businessman and the leader of the largest business conglomerate of the 
country – was the most important.197 Liem Soe Liong’s involvement in Kadin 
was aimed at bridging the gap between the Indonesian and Chinese 
businessmen. Sukamdani, at the time chairman of Kadin, supported this 
intention, although several Kadin leaders and the native Indonesian 
businessmen did not appreciate his involvement. Again the government seemed 
to be unhappy about the idea of Kadin being financially independent. In fact, 
the Ministry of Finance decided that Kadin would have to be financially self-
supporting and did not give Kadin any financial support.198 A financially weak 
Kadin would make it easier for the government to neglect the business sector 
when drawing up economic policies.199 
The process towards legal recognition in 1987 was a long and difficult 
one. First, the statutes (AD/ART) of the organization formalizing its existence 
had to be established, so that legal recognition was possible based on an act 
ratified by parliament. This process of establishing Kadin’s statutes started in 
1981 with the formation of Team-Enam (Team of Six), chaired by Sukamdani. 
This team had to draft first versions of the statutes and act that would be 
acceptable to the government. In order to achieve this, Sukamdani started to 
contact government officials in high positions, among whom were 
representatives of the military, some ministers, and the chairman of Golkar.200 
Legal recognition of Kadin could only be achieved if it was officially supported 
by high-ranking government officials, and especially by the President. After 
consulting these officials and after visiting and receiving approval by President 
Soeharto, the statutes were formally approved and established in September 
1982. 
Next, the act on which Kadin’s legal recognition would be based had to 
be drafted and approved. This approval followed a similar route. After President 
Soeharto ordered the act to be discussed in parliament for approval, it was 
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finally enacted by parliamentary decision on 28 January 1987 with the 
establishment of Law No. 1/1987 on Kadin. 
However, the question remains to what extent the final version of the law 
contained any references to Kadin’s potential role in economic policymaking 
processes. Of course, with the legal recognition confirmed by this law, Kadin 
was the only business organization that had an official role in policymaking. 
This gave it, at least potentially, a stronger position as compared to other 
business representatives when talking with the government. But did the law 
actually give Kadin a role in policymaking? When looking at the contents of 
both the statutes and act, there are no references to clearly formulate this. For 
example, one of the main articles of the act is Article 7, Chapter IV, stating that: 
 
... [Kadin] shall perform the activities, among others: a) giving 
information on the government’s policy in the economic sector to the 
Indonesia entrepreneurs; b) giving information on the world economic 
problems and developments, that can influence national economic life 
and business, to the Government and all entrepreneurs; c) channeling 
the aspirations and interest of the entrepreneurs in commercial, 
industrial, and service sectors in the framework of its participation in 
the economic development; d) implementing useful education, 
training, and other activities in the framework of promoting and 
developing the ability of the Indonesia entrepreneurs; e) implementing 
and improving relationship and cooperation supporting and profitable 
to each other, including development of relationship between 
industrial sector and other economic sectors; f) making effort to 
maintain union on the one hand and prevent unhealthy competition on 
the other among the Indonesia entrepreneurs, and realize a 
harmonious cooperation among the state owned undertakings, 
cooperatives, and private companies and create equalization of 
business opportunities; g) implementing and improving the 
relationship and cooperation between Indonesian and foreign 
entrepreneurs together with the requirements and interest of the 
economic development in accordance with the objectives of the 
National Development; h) implementing domestic and foreign 
promotions, statistical, analysis and business information center; i) 
making effort to balance and preserve the nature and prevent damages 
and living environment pollution. 
(Article 7, Chapter IV of the Act) 
 
Although the above article contains a long list of tasks, especially pointing 
at Kadin’s role as intermediary between government and business, there is no 
clear reference to its role as an advisor or consultative partner with respect to 
economic policymaking. One of the few explicit references can be found in 
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Article 11 of the statutes, which states that it ‘should give its opinion and 
recommendation to the government and other institutions in the formation of the 
country’s economic policy.’ 
Based upon the above discussion it can be concluded that Law No. 1/1987 
did not really fulfill the hopes of Kadin’s leadership. The law did not contribute 
much to strengthening Kadin’s position vis-à-vis the government. Moreover, it 
did not help to strengthen Kadin’s position with respect to its members either. 
The law did not comply with the wishes of the leaders of Kadin to make 
membership of the organization compulsory for business associations. What is 
more, the law stipulated that Kadin should also take into account the interests of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and co-operatives, as from now on these 
organizations could also become a member of Kadin.201 In discussions with the 
government to obtain formal recognition, Kadin’s chairman Sukamdani could 
not prevent these organizations from becoming members. In the opinion of the 
Indonesian business society, this weakened Kadin’s internal and external 
position. First of all, now it had to take into account more interests that were 
potentially conflicting. Second, it seemed that the government, by including 
state-owned enterprises as members, meant to increase its control over Kadin. 
This impression was further stressed by the fact that the new chairman of Kadin 
in 1988, Sotion Ardjanggi, used to be a high-ranking government official. His 
election was not appreciated by the business society, because it reinforced the 
impression that Kadin was simply an extension of the government. Apparently, 
they saw Ardjanggi’s election as a government attempt to increase its influence 
within Kadin.202 
Thus, one possible and actually rather plausible interpretation of the 
contents of Law No. 1/1987 was that the government did not aim at retreating 
from the corporatist model of the New Order. To the contrary, the law seemed 
to underline the corporatist relationship between state and business as it was 
envisioned by President Soeharto and the political leaders of the country.  
4.4 The Structure of Kadin 
During its inception, Kadin structured the organization hierarchically. The 
organizational structure consisted of three main parts: Kadin Indonesia (the 
headquarters of the organization), regional branches of Kadin (Kadinda), and 
the sectoral and subsectoral industry or business associations. At least until the 
late 1980s, the Kadinda were relatively passive, basically following directions 
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of Kadin Indonesia. The Kadinda played the role of intermediary between the 
national level of Kadin and the sectoral and subsectoral business associations. 
Moreover, within the Kadinda, Golkar played an important role, as many 
regional branch leaders were members of the party. This way the government 
could maintain control over the business sector – also at the regional level. 
Of special importance during the first ten years were the (sub) sectoral 
business associations. Although most associations were rather passive, some 
were challenging Kadin Indonesia and demanded a better representation by 
Kadin’s leaders. During the 1970s and part of the 1980s, there was a real 
struggle within Kadin between the passive Kadinda and some of the more active 
sectoral associations. The struggle between the Kadinda and the business 
associations also played an important role in the establishment of Law No. 
1/1987. As was discussed above, Kadin leaders and especially Sukamdani had 
lobbied for a legal recognition of the organization for many years. One reason 
why this took so long was that the government was skeptical about the fact that 
– given the internal conflicts between the Kadinda and the business associations 
– Kadin would be the best organization through which it could control the 
business community. 
When Sotion Ardjanggi was chairman of Kadin (1988-1994), one of his 
goals was to harmonize the organization. Under his leadership, several 
organizational changes were introduced focusing on reducing friction between 
the Kadinda and the business associations. This appeared to be difficult, 
however. One relevant example is the struggle in the 1980s, concerning the 
differences in voting rights given to the Kadinda and the business associations. 
In the 1982 revision of the Kadin statutes, these institutions had been given 
different positions. While the Kadinda received the status of distinctive member 
(anggota luar biasa), business associations were given the status of ordinary 
member (anggota biasa). This difference was linked to the voting power within 
Kadin with respect to decisions concerning policies and programs. Only 
‘distinctive members’ were able to influence Kadin’s decision making with their 
vote; ordinary members did not have this opportunity. Choosing the chairman 
and members for Kadin’s board of directors was one of the main issues where 
the voting right was involved. The business associations only had the right to 
propose candidates, not to choose or to vote for them. This was a radical change 
from the period before 1982, when the Kadinda and business associations had 
the same voting power. The decision to change the voting power was made by 
the Kadin leaders, because it feared the dominance of some business 
associations within the organization. They felt that these associations had 
gained too much influence, and that this trend needed to be halted. 
Obviously, the business associations were opposed to this. The tension 
continued, even after a new internal constitution was adopted in 1995, giving 
the business associations limited voting right: the number of votes by business 
associations could not exceed 20 per cent of the number of votes by the 
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Kadinda. Clearly, this implied that Kadinda’s choice of chairman and members 
of the board of directors could hardly be challenged by the business 
associations. 
Ardjanggi’s successor was Aburizal Bakrie, someone from the private 
business sector. From 1994 to 2004 he led Kadin for two terms. This was a 
hectic period, which includes the economic crisis of 1997-1998 and the fall of 
the New Order regime in 1998. Aburizal Bakrie was and still is a very 
successful businessman. In the early 1970s he was one of the founders of 
HIPMI, the influential Young Entrepreneurs Association, an association 
residing under Kadin that was rather critical of Kadin’s role in representing 
business interests towards the government. In 2007 he was the richest man of 
the country according to Forbes.203 During Bakrie’s leadership the voice of the 
private sector within Kadin became much stronger.204 In 2004, after resigning, 
he became Minister of Economic Affairs. From 2004 Kadin was led by 
Mohamad S. Hidayat, also from the private business sector. The history of the 
different Presidents of Kadin since the late 1960s shows that the role of the 
military within Kadin waned over the years and that the role of the private 
sector increased. 
Since its establishment in 1968, Kadin developed a rather complicated 
internal structure. This reflects the fact that the organization incorporates 
several different stakeholders with different interests. The organization is led by 
the executive board of which the President (or chairman) of Kadin is the most 
important member.205 The selection of the President has always been an issue. 
Given the weak financial position of Kadin, the President should be someone 
who is able and willing to financially support the organization and/or have a 
network from which financial support can be obtained. Moreover, he should 
have a good relationship with high government officials. The incentive for 
someone becoming the President of Kadin and providing support to the 
organization is that this position is generally seen as an ideal springboard for 
anyone with political ambitions.206  
Directly residing under the President of Kadin are several vice-Presidents, 
who are heading two to four so-called compartments. These vice-Presidents are 
all members of the executive board. The compartments are classified based on 
functional or sectoral considerations. There are 56 compartments in total (1999-
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2004).207 The executive board is supported by several institutes and boards. One 
of these is the Institute for Economic Research, Studies and Development 
(LP3E, a research institute of Kadin). 
The actual members of Kadin are business associations and associations 
of entrepreneurs; these reside under the compartments. In 1999-2004 there were 
157 business associations and ten associations of entrepreneurs that were 
members of Kadin. Some examples of these business associations are the 
National Private Banks Association, the Indonesia National Construction Works 
Contractors, the Indonesia Mining Association, and the National Association of 
Oil and Gas Distribution. The members of these associations are individual 
companies. The business associations represent the specific business interests of 
their members. According to some estimates, around 57,000 companies are 
currently a member of one of the business associations connected to Kadin.208 
In contrast, the associations of entrepreneurs focus on supporting the 
claims made by specific categories of entrepreneurs. Examples of associations 
of entrepreneurs are the Indonesian Veteran Economic Council, the Indonesian 
Small Scale Industry Association, the Indonesian Young Entrepreneurs 
Association (HIPMI209), the Indonesian Indigenous Entrepreneurs Association 
(HIPPI210), and the Indonesian Women Entrepreneurs Association. Next to these 
associations of entrepreneurs, Kadin also contains Apindo, the Indonesian 
Employers’ Association, which was founded in 1952 (as PUSPI, later renamed 
in 1985).211 One of the main tasks of Apindo is that it is responsible for 
representing Kadin in relation to labor affairs in tripartite meetings with 
government and labor. As we will see in Chapter 7, Apindo played an important 
role in dealing with the changing laws on labor after 1998. 
Next to companies, individual businessmen may also become a member 
of Kadin. The membership of individual businessmen is in fact rather important. 
Most individual members are influential and wealthy people who bring in 
funding and personal networks.212 Finally, as has been mentioned above, since 
1987 state-owned enterprises and co-operatives may also be a member of 
Kadin. However, their role in the organization remains relatively small. 
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4.5 Kadin and the Institutionalization of Business Represen-
tation 
In order to be able to represent business interests, Kadin has always aimed at 
developing networks of communication with internal and external parties, 
through internal committees, workshops, etc. Discussions with its members 
(private businesses, individual businessmen, state-owned companies, and co-
operatives) are important for the Kadin leaders if they want to stay informed on 
important interests. Moreover, the main external partners for Kadin in achieving 
its goals are the state institutions in general, and the President, members of 
parliament, as well as high officials at the ministries – including the ministers 
themselves – in particular. The fact that Kadin is legally recognized as the peak 
business organization gives it leverage in the contacts with these state 
institutions. 
The relationship between Kadin and the government has evolved during 
the period after the reformasi. With respect to the relationship with ministries, 
especially since the fall of the New Order regime, representatives of Kadin’s 
leadership are involved in policymaking forums of the ministries, the so-called 
Rapat Kerja. Here, discussions take place about the kind of policies that should 
be developed. For Kadin it is important to be present at these discussions, since 
it provides information about the government’s view on economic 
developments, its policy initiatives, and its perception of the possible constraints 
with respect to economic and business-related issues. Kadin representatives also 
participate more directly in the implementation of economic policies. In 
particular, after ratification of a new law Kadin may help to introduce the new 
law by organizing seminars amongst its members to discuss and explain the 
law, by participating in monitoring the implementation of the law by its 
members, etc.213 Through these relationships with ministries, Kadin has, at least 
theoretically, a chance to represent business interests and to influence 
policymaking in such a way that these interests are taken into account when 
political decisions are taken.214  
Next to these relationships with the ministries, Kadin has direct contacts 
with the President. The chairman of Kadin may be invited by the President to 
exchange views on economic developments and policymaking issues. 
Moreover, representatives of Kadin and the President may meet during cabinet 
meetings, at meetings and forums of Indonesian and foreign businessmen 
(organized by Kadin or a foreign chamber of commerce) at which the President 
is expected to speech, and during the President’s trips abroad for which 
influential businessmen are also invited. Also these discussions may enable 
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relationships with the government will be provided in the three case studies in Chapters 5-7. 
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Kadin to influence policy decisions in favor of business interests. It must be said 
though that since the fall of Soeharto direct contacts with the President of 
Indonesia has become far less effective, since nowadays the President does not 
have the same power as Soeharto used to have. 
With respect to parliament, again Kadin’s position appears to have been 
affected by the developments since 1998. Before 1998, Golkar was the 
dominant political party in parliament (DPR). At the same time, as we have 
seen in Chapter 3, many members of Kadin (among them chairmen like 
Sukamdani, Aburizal Bakrie and Hidayat, as well as several vice-Presidents) 
were also a member of and/or had close connections with Golkar. This provided 
Kadin with good opportunities for direct access to members of parliament. After 
1998, Golkar continued to be an important party in parliament, which means 
that access to members of the parliament has not stopped. Apart from their close 
contacts to Golkar party members, Kadin is able to communicate with members 
of parliament at parliamentary hearings, where they can discuss business 
interests and other issues related to economic developments. 
Still, the possibilities to influence parliamentary decisions seem to have 
diminished. Before 1998, Kadin also had access to the People’s Consultative 
Assembly (MPR), where it held one seat in the Utusan Golongan Ekonomi, the 
representative from the economic community. Yet, during the political reforms 
after 1998, with the termination of the Utusan Golongan Ekonomi Kadin’s 
active role in the MPR ended.215 
Apart from the above channels through which Kadin aims to influence 
government policy, it also uses other channels, like the media. Especially after 
1998, when the freedom of press was greatly improved, the leaders of Kadin 
often used the media, by making public statements, to voice the interests of its 
members. As we will see in our case studies, on many occasions Kadin leaders 
voiced their views on the creation of the new anti-monopoly law (Chapter 5) 
and labor law (Chapter 7) by giving interviews and writing columns in 
newspapers. Another way of communicating business interests is organizing 
conferences and seminars. At these conferences and seminars the business 
sector can communicate its concerns and demands to members of parliament 
and ministries. 
Kadin’s role in policymaking and its relations with the government in this 
process will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 5 to 7. In these chapters, we 
provide detailed descriptions of cases of specific government policies and the 
interaction between Kadin and the government in forming these policies. 
                                                 
215
 The relationship between Kadin and parliament will be discussed in more detail in the 
three case studies presented in Chapters 5 to 7 of this thesis. 
  
 78 
4.6 Kadin and Internal Conflicts of Interest 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the effectiveness of a business association in 
representing the interests of its members depends among other things on its 
credibility with its members. Do members accept the association as the 
representative of their interests? And does the government see the association as 
the one they need to talk to when discussing business interests? It is argued that 
an organization’s credibility depends on the extent to which it can maintain a 
stable internal organization by adequately managing its internal conflicts of 
interest. The more it has to deal with internal conflicts of interest (or the less 
stable its internal organization), the lower its credibility with business members 
and government officials, the lower its effectiveness in terms of representing 
business interests. Below, these issues will be further discussed. In particular, 
we focus on describing the internal conflicts of interest Kadin has had to deal 
with over the past few decades. Such a discussion is important for evaluating 
whether and to what extent Kadin has had (and still has) credibility problems. 
As the discussion in Section 4.4 above shows, Kadin has a rather complex 
internal organizational structure, which is highly hierarchical – very much like 
the government and Golkar organized relations with society from the top, right 
down to the provinces, municipalities and towns. Kadin as the peak business 
organization is also very broad in its coverage. Its task is to represent business 
in general, it has members from all kinds of industrial sectors and subsectors, 
and it has to deal with members who may have very different backgrounds. This 
also means that it may sometimes have to represent conflicting interests from 
different parts of the business community. For example, the interests of 
exporting companies on some occasions are probably different from those in the 
import-competing industries: while the first group will profit from exchange 
rate depreciations, the second will be hurt by them. Moreover, since 1987 Kadin 
also represents state-owned enterprises and co-operatives. These groups of 
businesses, at least in theory, add to the different interests Kadin has to serve.216 
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 In general, state-owned enterprises do not seek profit but provide public goods; co-
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goals of private companies, which are to maximize profit and efficiency. It must be said, 
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a place where these private entrepreneurs could meet and draw up recommendations to the 
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All in all, the chances of there being conflicting ideas and interests among 
members of Kadin are relatively high.  
The challenge for the Kadin leadership has always been to take into 
account these different interests when communicating with the President, 
ministries, and members of parliament about the policies to be carried out. The 
better the leaders are able to handle the different demands, the higher Kadin’s 
credibility among its members, as well as with the government. As will be 
shown later on in this thesis, however, the different groups represented by 
Kadin had at times very conflicting interests, which in practice made life very 
difficult for the leaders to represent businesses properly.217 In this section on the 
conflicts of interest and power struggles within the Indonesian business sector, 
we take a broad perspective and focus on two main issues: conflicts of interest 
between indigenous and Chinese businessmen, and conflicts of interest between 
large, small, and medium-sized enterprises. 
 
Conflicts of Interest between Indigenous and Chinese Businessmen 
The Indonesian business sector consists of companies led by indigenous and 
Chinese businessmen. As such the Indonesian business sector reflects the main 
conflicts within the Indonesian society as a whole, i.e. the conflict between the 
indigenous and Chinese (and to lesser extent the Indian) population, which at 
some occasions in the past few decades led to ethnic conflicts and riots, 
especially during the economic crisis of 1997-1998. These conflicts were severe 
and several times Chinese businessmen needed to be protected by the military, 
the police or influential indigenous Indonesians in order to be able to maintain 
their business. 
With respect to the business sector, before the independence in 1945, the 
Europeans, together with the Chinese businessmen, dominated the economy. 
These two groups controlled the main industrial and trade companies of the 
country. The Indonesians were mainly active in small businesses in the 
traditional sectors, such as agriculture and handicrafts. After 1945, the 
indigenous Indonesians gained political and economic power. However, with 
respect to economic power, the Chinese kept their dominant position in trade 
and business. This dominance is perhaps most obvious when we look at the 
success of the Indonesian business groups. Chinese conglomerates such as the 
Salim Group, Lippo Group and Gajah Tunggal Group became highly successful 
after the economic liberalization programs the government initiated since the 
1980s. Although indigenous Indonesian conglomerates such as the Bimantara 
Group, Humpuss Group and Bukaka Group also profited from the liberalization 
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programs, they were not as successful as the Chinese.218 Moreover, in the 1990s 
many Chinese conglomerates seemed to be able to profit from their direct link 
with the government, and particularly with President Soeharto. They used these 
connections to obtain privileges such as exclusive import licenses, protected 
market shares, price controls, etc. In contrast, only a few indigenous 
conglomerates were able to obtain such privileges; if they were successful, 
members of the Soeharto family were usually directly or indirectly involved. 
As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, in the late 1960s Kadin-Jaya, 
the predecessor of Kadin Indonesia, was founded in order to protect the 
indigenous Indonesian interests against the domination of Chinese businessmen. 
The domination of the Chinese led to frictions between the indigenous and 
Chinese Indonesians and these frictions could also be noticed within Kadin. In 
particular, the indigenous Indonesians found it difficult to accept the economic 
dominance of the Chinese.219 
One example of the ponderous relationship between the indigenous and 
Chinese Indonesians within Kadin during its first years refers to the 
establishment of the Indonesian Indigenous Entrepreneurs Association (HIPPI) 
in the 1970s. This association was used as a forum to criticize the dominant 
position of the Chinese in the Indonesian economy. At the same time, however, 
criticizing the Chinese was also difficult and potentially dangerous if one 
wanted to do business, mainly because of the Chinese dominance. In later years, 
and especially since the presidency of Sukamdani, Kadin aimed at bridging the 
gap between the Chinese and indigenous businessmen. 
Still, tensions were real and focused on the dominance of the Chinese 
businessmen in the Indonesian economy. In the 1950s President Soekarno 
launched Program Banteng, which aimed at giving indigenous Indonesian 
businessmen preferential treatment with respect to import licenses. However, 
the program was not very successful, since many indigenous businessmen sold 
the licenses to Chinese businessmen and made a lot of money. In a similar vein, 
in 1980 the government launched Presidential decree No. 14-A/1980, which 
established prioritization of indigenous business over Chinese business, in order 
to reduce the gap in economic power between both groups. Thus, the decree 
was an attempt of the government to effectively stimulate indigenous 
Indonesian business activities. 
A final example of the conflicting relationship between Chinese and 
Indonesian businessmen was triggered by the economic crisis of 1997-1998. 
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Many people accused the conglomerates of being the main cause of this crisis, 
since they had borrowed huge amounts from abroad for which the people and 
the government had to pay. As a consequence, the Chinese and indigenous 
conglomerates bickered about who was to blame most for the economic 
downturn. When the public decided that the Chinese were to blame most, 
Aburizal Bakrie proposed to the government to redistribute assets from business 
people with Chinese origins to the native Indonesian business people. However, 
after numerous big businessmen with Chinese origins fled from Indonesia, he 
called upon them to come back to help build up the economy.220 
The Chinese in turn tried to protect their vulnerable position against the 
influence of the indigenous Indonesians. Many Chinese businessmen were not 
interested in becoming a member of Kadin, because they saw Kadin as a 
business organization that was dominated by indigenous people. Instead, they 
decided to seek direct and personal contact with government officials to protect 
their interests. 
At the same time, when Kadin was faced with financial deficits in the 
1980s because its operational costs were too high to be covered by membership 
fees, Liem Soe Liong – a Chinese businessman and one of the most influential 
persons in the Indonesian economy – together with a few other Chinese 
business leaders financed the deficit. Their main incentive for doing this was 
that they hoped that Indonesian businessmen would no longer criticize their 
business activities.221 
Over time, the economic dominance of the Chinese slowly diminished as 
more and more indigenous Indonesians became successful businessmen and/or 
held crucial management positions, even in companies that were owned by 
Chinese. At the same time, several Chinese businessmen became involved in 
the organization of Kadin. For example, Liem Soe Liong was appointed as a 
member of the Dewan Pembina Kadin, an advisory council to the board of 
executives of Kadin on economic matters. Other Chinese businessmen such as 
Prayogo Pangestu (from business group Barito Pacific), The Ning King 
(business group Daya Manunggral) and Syamsul Nursalim (Gajah Tunggal), 
also held advisory positions.222 James Riady (son of Muchtar Riady, head of the 
Lippo Group – one of the largest financial conglomerates of the country) 
became involved in Kadin as a member of the Committee of Investment, which 
is also an advisory council to the board of executives. It must be said, however, 
that the Chinese businessmen preferred to play only a modest role within Kadin. 
Although the Chinese businessmen never actually came on the executive board, 
they were still able to play a role in decision making. 
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Despite the abovementioned developments, the rivalry between both 
groups remained fierce. According to some, this rivalry led to the impotence of 
the business community to undertake collective action in terms of specific 
demands for policy actions by the government that could have helped reduce the 
negative impact of the Asian crisis in Indonesia.223 One example of this are the 
attempts to support the small business sector that had been severely hit by the 
crisis of 1997-1998. Several large business groups came up with plans and 
actions to help reduce the impact of the crisis. In this way they tried to reduce 
the outrage in society about the role they had played in triggering the crisis. Yet, 
initiatives were launched by different groups of large businesses, which were 
formed along ethnic lines.224 The initiatives these groups launched were not 
very successful in combating the adverse impact of the crisis on the small 
business sector. Kadin did not succeed in co-ordinating the various initiatives 
that might have improved their success. 
 
Conflicts of Interest between Large and Small and Medium-Sized Enter-
prises 
A second and very important conflict of interest within Kadin was that between 
the small and large companies. Especially the small companies felt that their 
demands and interests were not taken seriously by the Kadin leadership.225 This 
conflict had been important since the foundation of Kadin, but it seems to have 
worsened over the years, especially after the fall of the Soeharto government 
and the subsequent democratization, when small company entrepreneurs were 
disappointed about voicing their demands. As discussed briefly in the previous 
section, the small business sector had suffered a lot during the crisis. In the case 
studies described in Chapter 5 (on the anti-monopoly law) and Chapter 6 (on the 
procurement of government projects), the conflict of interests between large and 
small enterprises is discussed in more detail. In these two case studies we refer 
to complaints that were often made by small enterprises about the dominance of 
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big business and to the demand for preferential treatment to support small 
business. 
The role of large enterprises in Kadin was particularly pronounced in 
some of the larger business associations. As was already discussed in Section 
4.2, although they were a member of Kadin, many business people – especially 
those connected to large business conglomerates – had direct channels to the 
government to get things done. They used their contacts for their own business 
interests. Especially during the 1990s, the role of large businesses had become 
stronger. In the cement industry nine large cement factories, which were all 
members of the business association ASI (Asosiasi Semen Indonesia), 
controlled the prices and distribution of cement; effectively, they had 
established a cartel. The business association for the forestry industry, Apkindo 
(Asosiasi Panel Kayu Indonesia), was dominated by its chairman Bob Hasan, 
who had developed a very close relationship with President Soeharto, which 
gave him a very powerful position within the forestry business.226 Bob Hasan 
obtained a monopoly on issuing licenses for exporting timber. Prayogo 
Pangestu of the Barito Pacific Group was also an important player in the 
forestry sector. The fluor industry was dominated by PT Bogasari, a company 
owned by Liem Soei Liong. In the clove industry, Tommy Soeharto, son of the 
President, controlled KUD (Koperasi Unit Desa, the village co-operatives) and 
monopolized the sector. PT Chandra Asri, a private company which was partly 
owned by the Soeharto family, dominated the chemical industry. These 
examples all illustrate the fact that large businesses were members (and often 
also chairman) of business associations and of Kadin, and that they dominated 
several of these business associations because of their close connections with 
the government. In their role as members of Kadin they were hardly interested 
in representing the interests of other businesses in the same sector, in particular 
the medium and small business. 
It must be admitted that Kadin developed several initiatives aiming at 
reinforcing and supporting the position of small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Kadin organized several exhibitions to help promote business activities of these 
enterprises.227 Moreover, it established a special compartment for small and 
medium-sized enterprises, focusing on promotion. Finally, several associations 
were established to empower small and medium enterprises, such as the Small-
Scale Industries Associations, the Indonesian Small-Business Association, the 
Indonesian Society of Small and Medium Scale Businessmen, and the 
Indonesian Small-Scale Business Entrepreneurs Association. However, these 
initiatives were not very successful in terms of improving the position of small 
and medium enterprises within the Indonesian business community. 
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In the early 2000s, the disappointment among small businesses about the 
lack of support from the government and from Kadin even led to the initiative 
of Elias Tobing to establish a new peak business organization: Kadin-UKM, 
which should represent small business interests. Such initiatives were a direct 
reaction to the disappointment of small business entrepreneurs concerning the 
new accreditation-certification rules, allowing enterprises e.g. to tender for 
government projects.228 They were particularly disappointed about the role of 
Kadin in the process of establishing these new rules. They felt that Kadin had 
not paid attention to their demands concerning this important issue.229 One of 
the main complaints was that under the new rules the possibilities for small 
companies to obtain a certificate were reduced due to the high costs.230 
The initiatives to set up Kadin-UKM led to reactions from the President 
of Kadin, Aburizal Bakrie, who pointed out that according to Law No. 1/1987, 
Kadin is the only peak business organization that is formally accepted. 
Establishing a new organization for small businesses only, especially when 
using the name Kadin, would therefore be illegal. Also, other high Kadin 
officials like Datubara, representing Kadinda-DKI, were strongly opposed 
against the initiatives of Tobing and his supporters. Datubara pointed out that, 
within Kadin there were several other channels (such as the various conferences 
organized by Kadin) through which small companies could express their 
views.231  
The conflict between Tobing and his supporters versus the Kadin 
leadership was finally brought to court. The court decided that Tobing had to 
stop his initiatives, as it supported Aburizal Bakrie’s claim that Kadin was the 
only formally accepted peak business organization and the only organization 
that could use the name Kadin. Notwithstanding this defeat, dissatisfaction 
among small business entrepreneurs with respect to Kadin’s role in representing 
their interests continued and is still fairly strong, although it is not always 
expressed openly. 
4.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has discussed Kadin as the peak organization representing the 
interests of the Indonesian business sector. In particular, we have focused on 
discussing to what extent Kadin can play a significant role as the peak business 
organization by influencing policymaking decisions. The theoretical framework 
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presented in Chapter 2 states that an effective business representation depends 
on the legitimacy, credibility and institutionalization of a business association 
vis-à-vis the state and society. This chapter has discussed all three aspects.  
With respect to the legitimacy of Kadin, the discussion focused on the 
establishment of Law No. 1/1987, which formally recognized the institution as 
the peak business representation. As the discussion in Section 4.4 shows, 
although this law formalized Kadin’s role in state-business relations, it did not 
do much for its influence on state policy concerning issues related to business 
practice. To some extent, the law even seemed to have reduced Kadin’s position 
vis-à-vis the state and the business community, as it stipulated that Kadin 
should now also represent interests of state-owned enterprises and co-
operatives. 
When it comes to the institutionalization of Kadin’s channels and the 
mechanisms it uses to represent business interests, the discussion in Section 4.5 
showed that the nature of these channels have changed over time. In the past, a 
major channel of representation was its relationship with Golkar, the most 
important political party during the Soeharto regime. Moreover, Kadin had 
direct access to the People’s Consultative Assembly through its seat in the 
Utusan Golongan Ekonomi. After 1998, these channels became less effective, 
because Golkar’s role in parliament had been reduced, while at the same time 
Kadin lost its seat in the Utusan Golongan Ekonomi. At the same time, 
however, the political reforms and the related process of democratization after 
1998 have opened up possibilities for Kadin to be actively involved in 
policymaking forums and to have direct discussions with ministries on policy 
decisions. Moreover, over the past few years the Kadin leadership has had 
intensive contacts with the President, discussing economic development and 
policy issues. It must be acknowledged, however, that after 1998 this direct link 
with the President became less important when it comes to influencing 
policymaking, simply because nowadays the President is far less influential than 
Soeharto used to be. Finally, Kadin increasingly used the media to increase its 
role in influencing policymaking. The possibility of using the media for this 
purpose is a direct consequence of the political reforms after 1998, one of which 
was the increasing freedom of press.  
The discussion in Section 4.6 showed that since its establishment, Kadin 
has been faced with several internal conflicts of interest and power struggles. 
These conflicts of interest have made Kadin’s role as peak business 
organization a difficult one. The Indonesian business sector was characterized 
by the fragmentation of interests, i.e. different parts or segments of the business 
sector at the national level had different interests. Because so many different 
groups of businesses need to be represented by Kadin, it turned out to be very 
difficult to satisfy all demands from al these different groups. This affected the 
organization’s credibility, both among its own members (e.g. the conflict of 
interest between the small and large business entrepreneurs) and with the 
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government (e.g. the conflict between the business associations and the 
Kadinda). This fragmentation of the Indonesian business sector made Kadin less 
effective when trying to represent the interests of the business sector vis-à-vis 
the state and society. 
In Chapters 5 to 7, where we discuss three case studies of economic 
policymaking and the role of Kadin in forming these policies, we will further 
explore the role of its legitimacy, institutionalization, and credibility. The three 
case studies aim at showing that the effectiveness of Kadin’s interventions 
depends on specific conditions under which the policymaking process takes 
place. The discussion of the case studies reveals the nature of these conditions, 
establishing to what extent Kadin was or was not effective after the reformasi. 
The analysis of the three case studies will show that especially internal 
conflicts, and related to this the lack of credibility, were an important factor 
hampering Kadin’s effectiveness in representing business interests. 
 
